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Abstract
We develop a dynamic agency model of a public corporation. Managers underinvest be-
cause of risk aversion. They smooth rents and payout. They do not exploit interest tax
shields fully. The interactions of investment, debt and payout decisions can change dras-
tically depending on managers’ preferences. Managers with power utility set investment,
debt and payout proportional to the firm’s net worth, generating a constant (possibly
negative) net debt ratio. With exponential utility, investment decisions are separated
from decisions about debt and payout. More profitable firms become cash cows and less
profitable firms accumulate debt, as in a pecking order model.
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1 Introduction
How do investment, financing and payout decisions interact in a mature public corporation
run by risk-averse managers? Will the managers over-invest? How agressively will they
pursue interest tax shields? Will the managers adopt a target leverage ratio or a pecking-
order debt policy – or is either policy possible, depending on managers’ preferences? When
will corporations accumulate cash and end up at negative net debt ratios? Why is payout
smoothed? Can payout smoothing be reconciled with a constant target debt ratio? We address
these and related questions in this paper.
Our answers include promising agency-based explanations for some corporate financing
and investment patterns that may otherwise remain puzzling. For example, our models can
explain why managers do not lever up to exploit interest tax shields fully, even in a Modigliani-
Miller (MM) setting with perfect financial markets and no information problems or costs of
financial distress. But it turns out that the financial policies adopted by risk-averse managers
can change drastically, depending on assumptions about their preferences.
The managers decide on risky capital investment and set capital structure and payout
policies. Their corporations can issue debt or equity at any time, but must respect an in-
tertemporal budget constraint, which forces sources of cash (operating income plus changes in
net debt) to equal uses (payout and managerial rents plus investment (CAPEX)). The budget
constraint eliminates one degree of freedom. For example, once CAPEX, payout and rents
are set, the required amount of borrowing follows directly from the budget constraint.
We set out a general dynamic agency model in Section 2. We find that managers under-
invest because of risk aversion. This result differs from most prior agency theory, which
assumes that managers over-invest because of private benefits or personal gains from empire-
building.
Payout and rents are tied together by the governance constraint and move together over
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time. The equation linking payout and rents depends on whether shareholders would choose
to close the firm or run it as a going concern. Corporate taxes relax the governance constraint
because rents are tax-deductible. Rents create valuable tax shields, which increase rents
relative to payout.
Managers smooth rents, and therefore payout, for two reasons. First, we assume decreasing
returns from rent extraction. Therefore volatile rents are inefficient. Second, risk aversion
causes rent smoothing because managers try to equalize the marginal utility of rents over
time. Hennessy and Whited (2007, p. 1737) note that structural models of investment,
payout and borrowing “[overshoot] the variance of corporate cash distributions. ... [W]e
still lack a theoretical rationale for dividend smoothing resulting from optimizing behavior.”
We say that payout smoothing results from the managers’ optimizing behavior in a dynamic
agency setting.
Risk aversion and decreasing returns to rent extraction each imply that managers will use
a mix of debt and equity financing, even when shareholders would prefer the firm to borrow
as much as possible. We explain why managers do not swap debt for equity in order to exploit
interest tax shields fully. Once managers optimize, they see the net marginal expected utility
from an additional dollar of debt as zero, even when shareholders see the NPV of that extra
debt as positive.
We clarify how debt disciplines managers. The discipline does not operate in the short run
by diverting cash flow to debt service. But a higher debt level reduces the future rents that
the managers can extract. Therefore discipline comes from the managers’ optimal dynamic
response to current and future debt levels.
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1.1 Closed-form solutions
Sections 3 and 4 present two closed-form solutions of the general model. The solutions are
derived in continuous time. All the general results from section 2 hold, but the nature of
the interactions between investment, payout and financing policies depends on the managers’
assumed utility function.
Section 3 assumes that the coalition of managers acts according to power utility and there-
fore displays constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). With power utility, CAPEX, borrowing,
rent and payout are all interdependent. The firm’s capital stock, net debt level and its flow
of payout and rents all end up proportional to net worth. In good times, the firm expands. It
invests more, issues more debt and pays out more to shareholders. Managers also take more
rents. In bad times the firm contracts, moving back down its expansion path. All changes
are proportional to net worth, so that the net debt ratio is constant.1 The ratios of CAPEX,
payout and rents to net worth are likewise constant.
We explore what determines the net debt ratio. It can be negative if the corporate tax rate
is low, managers’ level of risk aversion is high or investment is sufficiently risky. (A negative
net debt ratio means that the firm is a net lender.)
The CRRA model generates other interesting results. For example, taxes reduce risk for
managers and increase investment. Managers underinvest, except in a regime where prof-
itability is low and the firm should be liquidated under a first-best policy.
Section 4 derives an alternative closed-form solution assuming negative exponential utility,
that is, constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). In this case debt and net worth move in
opposite directions. In bad times the firm borrows more and depletes its net worth. Lenders
close the firm when it is on the cusp of insolvency and, in the absence of bankruptcy costs, fully
1In our continuous-time setting, debt is safe, because net worth never becomes negative. Safe debt allows
us to investigate the interactions of investment, borrowing, payout and rents in the closed-form solution.
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recover their money. This net-worth covenant keeps debt safe, allows a closed-form analysis
and facilitates comparison with the CRRA case.
All general results from section 2 hold in the CARA model, but CAPEX decisions are
independent of rent, payout and borrowing decisions. The stock of capital is constant if
investment opportunities are constant. Payout and rents include a fixed component, but also
respond to changes in net worth. Decisions about payout plus rents and borrowing interact.
In good (bad) times, the firm accumulates (depletes) net worth and pays down (issues more)
debt. Firms that perform well turn into cash cows, leaving more and more interest tax shields
unexploited. Unprofitable firms pile up debt and are eventually closed down by creditors.
Thus our CARA model does not generate a meaningful target debt ratio. Instead debt
becomes a short-run shock absorber, as in a pecking-order model. Changes in debt soak up
most of the fluctuations in operating income.
Different specifications of managers’ preferences therefore produce dramatically different
predictions about the major corporate financial decisions and how they interact. Power utility
generates results that are consistent with a trade-off theory of capital structure. Exponential
utility leads to results consistent with the pecking-order theory. With power utility, invest-
ment, debt and payout are interdependent, but with exponential utility managers separate
investment from financing decisions. We believe that the contrasts between our two closed-
form models’ results are original and important.
1.2 Previous literature
The managers in our agency model face a personal optimization problem similar to the prob-
lem faced by an individual investor who allocates wealth between consumption and risky
investment. Our managers take rents as consumption. They co-invest with outside share-
holders in a risky asset, the firm’s capital stock. They can also use corporate borrowing or
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lending to finance investment and to smooth or shift rents and payout over time. Key papers
on intertemporal consumption and portfolio selection include Merton (1969, 1971), Caballero
(1990), Campbell and Viceira (1999, 2002) and Angeletos and Calvet (2005, 2006).
The corporate-finance literature on investment, payout and borrowing decisions is of course
enormous. But there is only a short list of models that track the joint dynamics of all three
decisions. See Strebulaev and Whited (2012) and Sannikov (2013) for comprehensive surveys.
As far as we know ours is the only investigation of these decisions that is a fully dynamic
model, incorporates taxes, but is based on agency behavior by risk-averse managers rather
than financial frictions or imperfect financial markets.
Research papers that focus on all three decisions about investment, payout and borrowing
include Hennessy and Whited (2005, 2007), Gryglewicz (2011), DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and
Whited (2011), Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2011), De´camps, Mariotti, Rochet, and Villeneuve
(2011), and De´camps, Gryglewicz, Morellec, and Villeneuve (2016). These papers assume that
risk-neutral managers maximize market value. They investigate how taxes and transaction
and adjustment costs affect dynamics. We assume risk-averse managers and do not invoke
transaction costs, adjustment costs or other financial frictions.
These models usually leave payout as the residual. For example, DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and
Whited (2011) assume that the firm is free to restrict payout to pay down debt or to increase
cash holdings as a reserve for future investment. This assumption makes sense if payout is
value-irrelevant and managers are risk-neutral. We assume that payout decisions are value-
irrelevant for shareholders, but not for managers, because payout is tied to managers’ rents
and the managers are risk-averse. Consequently payout is not a residual but an important
decision variable, as it is in practice. For example, survey evidence by Brav, Graham, Harvey,
and Michaely (2005) shows that for executives, maintaining the dividend level is as important
as investment decisions. Dividends (see Lintner (1956)) and total payout (see Skinner (2008))
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are in practice much smoother than net income over time, at least for mature corporations
that make regular payouts to shareholders.
In Bolton, Chen and Wang (2011), firms pay out cash only when cash holdings are large,
so that the shadow price of cash held for future investment is small and the costs of holding
cash become burdensome. In De´camps et al. (2011, 2016), the costs of holding cash are
interpreted as a free cash flow problem (e.g. managers with access to cash take some of it
as private benefits). The objective assumed in this paper is still market-value maximization,
however. In Gryglewicz (2011), the firm is concerned about insolvency and lack of liquidity
in distress. Therefore, no payout occurs as long as cash reserves are below a target level, but
any cash above the target is paid out. In our model, payout cannot be a residual, because
managers maximize the utility of their rents, and payout follows rents.
Few dynamic models introduce meaningful agency issues. Zwiebel (1996) derives a dynam-
ically consistent model of capital structure as the optimal response of partially entrenched,
risk-neutral managers who always want to invest but also fear takeovers. Managers voluntarily
issue risky debt, accepting bankruptcy risk as a way of committing to forgo bad investments.
Morellec (2004) develops a real-options model in which risk-neutral managers want to invest
and also to retain control. Managers avoid control challenges by limiting negative-NPV invest-
ment. Our paper takes a different tack, assuming risk-averse managers, who end up investing
less than the value-maximizing amount.
DeMarzo, Fishman, He, and Wang (2012) consider investment and payout as results of an
optimal contract between risk-neutral shareholders as principals and a risk-neutral manager.
The firm builds up a cash reserve to finance investment and pays out dividends when the
cash reserve reaches a maximum level. Capital structure decisions are not modeled. We do
not solve for an optimal contract, but assume that the (risk-averse) managers of a public
corporation act in their self-interest, subject to a governance constraint.
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Morellec, Nikolov, and Schu¨rhoff (2012) assume that risk-neutral managers’ and share-
holders’ interests are aligned, except for the managers’ ability to capture a fraction of cash
flow to equity as private benefits. They explore the dynamics of capital structure, including
default and rebalancing strategies, but hold investment fixed. Our model does not include
default, but investment is endogenous. Our managers are risk-averse.
Lambrecht and Myers (2007, 2008) and Jin and Myers (2006) use an agency model like this
paper’s, but assume that managers are risk-neutral. They focus on narrower issues, including
takeovers, once-and-for-all investment or disinvestment decisions, and risk-shifting when the
firm is not transparent to outside investors.
This paper builds on Lambrecht and Myers (2012), who focused on payout policy. They
showed that payout is smoothed because rents are smoothed: the governance constraint forces
payout to follow rents. Changes in debt soak up transitory income shocks and accommodate
the gradual adjustment of rents and payout to changes in permanent income. But the role
of debt as a shock absorber in Lambrecht and Myers (2012) was not surprising, because they
took the capital stock as fixed and assumed that debt had no impact on market value.2 Here
we make investment endogenous and introduce valuable interest and rent tax shields. Also
Lambrecht and Myers (2012) formulate all results in discrete time for negative exponential
utility. Here we generalize several important results to any utility function and any stochastic
process for profitability. We derive closed-form solutions in continuous time for power utility as
well as for negative exponential utility and analyze how managers’ preferences affect corporate
financial policies.
2Lambrecht and Myers (2012) did comment on taxes, but considered the effects of interest tax shields only
in a Miller (1977) equilibrium in which the tax shields make no net addition to the market value of the firm.
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2 The general model
This section sets out our model of CAPEX, borrowing, payout and rents in its most general
form. We start by valuing the firm if it were run by risk-neutral shareholders, then introduce
risk-averse managers. We specify the managers’ objective, the governance constraint, the
budget (sources = uses) constraint and a no-Ponzi constraint that prevents runaway borrowing
and ensures finite claim values. We do not solve the model until Sections 3 and 4 below. We can
nevertheless derive important results from the model’s constraints and first-order conditions.
For example, the general model implies that managers will limit debt even when additional
borrowing would capture valuable interest tax shields.
2.1 Risk-neutral case
Consider a firm run by risk-neutral shareholders who seek to maximize market value. We
assume that the firm is profitable and expects to generate cash for payout and managerial
rents. The budget constraint is:
Dt = Dt−heρh +Kt − Kt−hepith +Ψt +h pt +τ
[
Kt−h
(
epith − 1) −Dt−h (eρh − 1) −Ψt] (1)
Dt is net debt. If Dt < 0, the firm is a net lender. Interest is compounded continuously at the
risk-free rate ρ over the time interval h, which is the time between payouts to shareholders.3
We do not introduce default risk here, but will show that debt is safe in the closed-form
solutions below.
The firm’s capital stock Kt, which is fixed one period in advance, generates a stochastic
gross return on capital at t+ h equal to epit+hh, where pit is a stochastic profit rate that is net
of capital depreciation. pit depends on exogenous demand shocks.
3Continuous compounding will allow for a straightforward transition to the continuous-time models (where
h→ 0) solved in sections 3 and 4 below.
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Ψt is a cost function. For example, Ψt can include operating costs and can be an increasing
convex function of Kt if production is subject to decreasing returns to scale. Ψt can also
capture adjustment costs of changing the firm’s stock of capital or its outstanding debt.
pt is the payout rate and h pt is the net payout (dividends plus net repurchases) to investors
at time t. Payouts are made at the end of each period, after the return on investment is
realized. Interest is paid on start-of-period debt. Interest on debt and any costs Ψt are
tax-deductible, but payouts to shareholders are not. Gross profits (given in Eq. (1) by the
expression between square brackets) are taxed at the corporate tax rate τ .
Define Γ ≡ eρh and Πt ≡ epith. Rearranging Eq. (1) gives:
Kt + h pt + (1− τ)Ψt −Dt = Kt−hΠt − ΓDt−h − τ [Kt−h (Πt − 1) −Dt−h (Γ − 1)] (2)
= Kt−h [Πt(1− τ) + τ ] − Dt−h [Γ(1− τ) + τ ] ≡ Nt (3)
where Nt is the net worth of the firm at time t. Eq. (3) shows that the net worth (Nt) and
net debt (Dt) are used to finance the stock of risky capital Kt, the after-tax costs (1 − τ)Ψt
and the payout to shareholders h pt.
For risk-neutral investor-managers, the market value of the equity is the present value of
current and future expected payout:
Ft = Et
[ ∞∑
j=0
ejρh h pt+jh
]
(4)
where hpt+jh is determined by the budget constraint Eq. (1).
4
Define the market discount factor by β ≡ e−ρh and the after-tax free cash flow from oper-
ations by CF ∗t ≡ Kt−h [Πt(1− τ) + τ ] − (1− τ)Ψt − Kt. Substituting the budget constraint
4Our exposition in this section assumes that the firm operates forever and that its debt is safe. These
assumptions hold in the closed-form solution in section 3: it is always optimal for managers to keep the firm
as a going concern and to manage debt so that default is avoided. Section 4 presents a closed-form solution
for a firm that may be shut down by a solvency (positive net worth) covenant imposed by lenders. The firm
may not operate forever, but the covenant protects lenders and assures that debt is safe.
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Eq. (1) into Eq. (4) gives the market value of the equity as:
Ft = Et
[ ∞∑
j=0
βjCF ∗t+jh
]
− (Γ(1− τ) + τ)Dt−h + Et
[ ∞∑
j=0
βjDt+jh (1− β [Γ(1− τ) + τ ])
]
(5)
≡ Vt − (Γ(1− τ) + τ)Dt−h + Tt (6)
The first term in Eq. (6) is the value of the unlevered firm (Vt), which equals the present
value of all (current and future) free cash flows after taxes. The second term is the amount of
debt rolled over from previous period, including the after-tax cost of interest. The third term
Tt is the discounted expectation of all future interest tax shields. The tax shields contribute
to firm value, just as in a textbook “MM + taxes” setting. The taxshield accrued over the
interval [t+ jh, t+ (j + 1)h] is:
Dt+jh (1− β [Γ(1− τ) + τ ]) = Dt+jhτ(1− β) (7)
Using a first-order Taylor approximation the interest tax shield for a small time interval h
equals approximately Dt+jhτρh.
Risk neutral investors would choose investment (Kt) and debt (Dt) to maximize equity
value given by Eq. (5).
Assuming that changes in debt or investment at t do not affect transaction costs beyond
t + h (i.e.
∂Ψt+j
∂Dt
=
∂Ψt+j
∂Kt
= 0 for j ≥ 2, the first-order conditions with respect to Dt and Kt
are:5
∂Ft
∂Dt
=
[
1− (1− τ)∂Ψt
∂Dt
]
+ β(−1)Et
[
Γ(1− τ) + τ + (1− τ)∂Ψt+h
∂Dt
]
= 0 (8)
∂Ft
∂Kt
=
[
−1− (1− τ)∂Ψt
∂Kt
]
+ βEt
[
(1− τ)Πt+h + τ − (1− τ)∂Ψt+h
∂Kt
]
= 0 (9)
Interest on debt grows at the after-tax borrowing rate (Γ(1− τ) + τ ≈ 1 + hρ(1− τ) for small
h), while future cash flows are discounted at the market discount factor (β = e−ρh). Absent
5We could have used payout pt and investment Kt as control variables. The solution would be the same.
The first-order condition with respect to Dt allows us to infer capital-structure implications more easily.
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any costs of adjustment or financial distress, investors want the firm to borrow as much as
possible:
∂Ft
∂Dt
= 1− β [Γ(1− τ) + τ ] = τ(1− β) > 0 if Ψt = Ψt+h ≡ 0
The benefit from issuing an extra dollar of debt equals the interest tax shield. With risk
neutrality, an interior optimal debt level only arises if there are some costs (Ψt) to offset the
tax-shield benefit. When agents are risk averse, such costs are no longer required to obtain
an interior optimal debt level, however.
We can also write the market value of equity as a function of the firm’s net worth Nt, plus
the tax shield Tt, plus the discounted expectation of all future (i.e. starting at t+h) after-tax
free cash flows, minus any money invested (Kt + (1− τ)Ψt).
Ft = Nt + Tt + Et
[ ∞∑
j=1
βjCF ∗t+jh
]
− Kt − (1− τ)Ψt
Net worth Nt, which includes the firm’s accumulated retained earnings, serves as an anchor
for the firm’s market value. This type of valuation equation is related to accounting valuation
models that use equity book values and future expected earnings as determinants of equity
prices (e.g. Ohlson (1995)).
2.2 Risk-averse managers
Now assume a self-interested coalition of managers that makes investment, financing and
payout decisions and extracts rents from the firm. Rents are benefits over and above the
managers’ opportunity wages. In practice rents can come in many forms, but here we assume
for simplicity that rents are cash costs to the firm. (We do not consider psychological benefits
of control, for example.)
Let s denote the fraction of rents that are tax-deductible.6 The after-tax cost of payout
and rents is therefore pt ≡ dt + (1 − τs)rt, where dt is the net payout to shareholders and
6Most rents, including cash payments, are tax deductible by the firm, but some may not be. For example,
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pt now represents total payout to shareholders and managers. Note that rt corresponds to
the monetary cost of rents to the firm, which is not necessary equal to the monetary value
of rents to managers. First, some rents can only be consumed hand-to-mouth. Examples
include job security and perks like use of a private jet, company car or provision of VIP health
insurance. An extra million spent by the company to upgrade a private jet is likely to be
worth less to the manager than a $1 million cash bonus. Moreover, the marginal value to
the manager of hand-to-mouth rents is likely to decline with their size. Second, some rents,
including cash bonuses, are subject to personal taxes. The marginal personal tax rate may
be increasing, again decreasing marginal value to managers. Third, rent extraction may be
costly to managers (see DeMarzo and Fishman (2007), for example). If so, it is reasonable to
assume that the marginal cost of extraction increases in the amount of rents extracted.
Therefore we assume that the monetary equivalent of rents rt to managers equals r
ν
t , where
ν ≤ 1. Increasing rents by 1% raises the rents’ value to managers by only ν%. When ν < 1,
managers will seek to smooth rents. As is standard in the literature on dynamic moral hazard
(see Bolton and Dewatripont (2005)) and on corporate finance we assume that risk-averse
agents cannot save, invest or borrow privately.7 This is a reasonable assumption here, as
the nature of many rents (such as job security, pensions, stock options, restricted stock and
hand-to-mouth rents) makes it costly or impossible for managers to vary, accelerate or delay
rents by transactions on their personal accounts.
The managers are risk-averse, with a concave utility function u(rνt ) for the monetary value
qualified (”statutory”) options, which are capped to a specific amount per employee, are taxed to the employee
only after they are exercised and the stock is sold. The employer is not allowed a deduction for these options.
The employer is allowed a deduction for non-qualified options, but only with a delay when and if the options
are exercised. See Bickley (2012) for further details.
7One notable exception that considers private saving and borrowing that is not observable to the principal
is Edmans et al. (2012), who study optimal compensation in a dynamic framework.
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of rents that they extract in period t. At each time t the infinitely-lived managers8 choose the
investment, debt, payout and rents (Kt, Dt, dt, rt) that maximize expected lifetime utility:
Mt ≡ maxEt
[ ∞∑
j=0
ωju(rνt+jh)h
]
(10)
where ω ≡ e−δh and δ is managers’ subjective discount rate. We assume δ ≥ ρ so that managers
can be more impatient than investors. For example, a manager will be more impatient if he
or she contemplates mortality.
We assume that outside shareholders can force managers to share free cash flow and value:
the fraction α (0 < α < 1) goes to the shareholders and the rest to the managers. We
interpret this sharing rule as the end result of a system of corporate governance. It can also
be viewed as the result of the following repeated bargaining game. Suppose that in each period
managers can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer (dt, rt) to shareholders, who can either accept or
take collective action to intervene. Acceptance means that managers keep their jobs for the
next period. Intervention eliminates managers’ rents (rt+jh = 0 for all j ≥ 0).
Let St denote the market value of shareholders’ equity. Managers set payout and rents so
that shareholders are indifferent between leaving managers in place for another period and
taking collective action:
St = h dt + βEt [St+h] = αmax [Ft, Nt] ≡ αmax [Vt − (Γ(1− τ) + τ)Dt−h + Tt , Nt] (11)
The left hand of Eq. (11) is the payoff to shareholders from leaving managers in place for
another period. The right hand is the payoff from intervention. Shareholders who intervene
can either keep the firm as a going concern, or they can liquidate the firm to realize its net
worth Nt.
9 However, shareholders only recover a fraction α of the firm value because collective
8Our model’s infinite horizon is important, because it eliminates end games. Managers’ financial decisions
could change drastically if they knew their tenure would end at a definite future date. See Fluck (1998) and
Myers (2000).
9Equation (11) does not consider optimal exercise of the put option to liquidate the firm. Instead it assumes
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action is costly.10 Eq. (11) is an equality because managers leave no money on the table. The
governance constraint is binding, not slack. Solving Eq. (11) for dt (see appendix) gives the
following proposition:
Proposition 1 The threat of collective action forces payout to move together with the after-
tax cost of managers’ rents. If it would be optimal for shareholders to keep the firm alive
then:
h dt =
(
α
1− α
)
rt (1− τs)h (12)
If it would be optimal for shareholders to liquidate the firm then:
hdt =
(
α
1− α
)
{rt(1− τs)h + Kt [1− βEt[Πt+h](1− τ)− βτ ] + (1− τ)Ψt − τ(1− β)Dt}
(13)
If it is optimal to keep the firm as a going concern, then payout to shareholders is proportional
to the after-tax cost of rents. This is a tax-adjusted version of the governance constraint in
Lambrecht and Myers (2012). A fraction s of rents is tax-deductible, so corporate taxes relax
the governance constraint and enable higher rents.
If shareholders would close the firm, then managers have to give shareholders extra payout
to compensate for not exercising an abandonment put. The added compensation is a fraction
for simplicity that shareholders, if they were to intervene, would just take Ft or Nt, whichever is higher. An
optimal exercise rule could shift the point at which the governance constraint based on liquidation value
replaces the constraint based on going-concern value. Proposition 1 below correctly specifies the payout policy
for each constraint, but it does not solve for the optimal switching point between the constraints. Integrating
an optimal exercise rule in our framework would significantly complicate the analysis with few additional
insights. Lambrecht and Myers (2008) derive the optimal payout switching point, but within a setting where
debt and investment are held constant. The matter is, however, moot for what follows as switching between
constraints does not arise in our worked out examples in sections 3 and 4.
10We could also include a fixed cost of collective action f . The effect would be to reduce the payout in
proposition 1 by a constant amount proportional to the interest on f .
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α/(1− α) of the expected return shortfall on the capital Kt invested, plus the after-tax cost
(1− τ)Ψt minus the debt tax-shield.
Proposition 1 is valid regardless of managers’ utility function and the profit process pit.
It reduces managers’ decision problem by one control variable (by dt given rt, for example)
because the constraint Eq. (11) is binding at all times.
Managers do not leave money on the table by paying out more than is needed to keep
outsiders at bay. Conversely, managers cannot cut payout relative to rents by promising extra
payout later, because promises are not credible. Therefore, the governance constraint Eq.
(11) does not rely on managers committing to keep future payout promises. We do assume
that managers will act rationally – and entirely in their self interest – in each future period,
and that shareholders anticipate the managers’ decision rules. The managers will take the
level of rents that is optimal for them, recognizing, however, that every dollar of rents has
to be matched by α(1 − τs)/(1 − α) dollars of payout in the going-concern case, and by a
state-dependent payout amount when the firm should be shut down.
2.3 Managers’ optimization problem
We can now state the managers’ optimization problem. Managers choose the investment,
debt, payout and rent policies (Kt, Dt, dt, rt) that maximize their expected lifetime utility of
rents:
Mt = maxEt
[ ∞∑
j=0
ωju(rνt+jh)h
]
(14)
subject to the budget constraint and no-Ponzi condition:
h(1− τs)rt + hdt = Dt −Dt−h [Γ(1− τ) + τ ] +Kt−h [Πt(1− τ) + τ ]−Kt (15)
lim
j→∞
[Γ(1− τ) + τ ]−jhDt+jh = 0 (16)
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The first-order conditions for Dt and Kt give the following Euler equations:
∂Mt
∂Dt
= u′(rνt )νr
ν−1
t
∂rt
∂Dt
h + ωEt
[
u′(rνt+h)νr
ν−1
t+h
∂rt+h
∂Dt
h
]
= 0 (17)
∂Mt
∂Kt
= u′(rνt )νr
ν−1
t
∂rt
∂Kt
h + ωEt
[
u′(rνt+h)νr
ν−1
t+h
∂rt+h
∂Kt
h
]
= 0 where : (18)
∂rt
∂Dt
=
{
1− (1− τ) ∂Ψt
∂Dt
− h ∂dt
∂Dt
}
h
[
1− τs + ∂dt
∂rt
] and ∂rt+h
∂Dt
=
(−1)
{
Γ(1− τ) + τ + (1− τ)∂Ψt+h
∂Dt
+ h∂dt+h
∂Dt
}
h
[
1− τs + ∂dt+h
∂rt+h
]
∂rt
∂Kt
=
{
−1− (1− τ) ∂Ψt
∂Kt
− h ∂dt
∂Kt
}
h
[
1− τs + ∂dt
∂rt
] and ∂rt+h
∂Kt
=
{
Πt+h(1− τ) + τ − (1− τ)∂Ψt+h∂Kt − h
∂dt+h
∂Kt
}
h
[
1− τs + ∂dt+h
∂rt+h
]
Note how the marginal changes in current ( ∂rt
∂Dt
, ∂rt
∂Kt
) and future (∂rt+h
∂Dt
, ∂rt+h
∂Kt
) rents are mul-
tiplied by the marginal utilities of rents u′(rνt ) νr
ν−1
t and u
′(rνt+h) νr
ν−1
t+h . With concave utility
(u′′ < 0) and/or decreasing monetary returns from rent extraction (ν < 1), satiation kicks in
as managers receive more upfront rents at the expense of future rents. Therefore rents will be
smoothed. Decreasing marginal utility will also limit both debt and investment as managers
optimize period by period. Managers will underinvest, compared with the value-maximizing
investment that shareholders would like them to make, and will limit borrowing. There is
an interior optimal debt level, even if interest tax shields add market value and there are no
frictions other than corporate taxes (Ψt = 0 and ν = 1).
An interior optimal debt ratio means that the managers will not exploit interest tax shields
fully. Suppose that, having reached their optimum, they consider issuing $1 million more of
debt. They could pay out α million of the debt proceeds to shareholders, keep a bonus of
(1 − α)/(1 − τs) for themselves and add market value from present and future interest tax
shields. But the extra debt would reduce future payout and rents because of required debt
service. (Debt is a senior claim, so managers’ share of future debt service must come from
rents.11) The one-off bonus would disrupt rent smoothing, increasing current rents at the
expense of more efficient rent extraction in the future, leaving the managers worse off. Thus
11Managers can capture a fraction of the cash inflow from additional corporate borrowing, but the same
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at their optimum the managers have already maximized expected lifetime utility and any
further capital structure changes could only decrease it.
Put it another way: Interest on debt accrues at the after-tax rate Γ(1−τ)+τ ≈ 1+ρh(1−τ).
The managers’ optimum debt policy adapts to this rate, not to the pre-tax rate used by share-
holders. The Euler Eq. (17) relates managers’ intertemporal marginal rate of substitution to
the after-tax corporate borrowing rate. Assume for simplicity that Ψt = 0 =
∂dt+h
∂Dt
= ∂dt
∂Dt
. De-
fine managers’ stochastic discount factor as wt+h ≡ ωu′(rνt+h)νrν−1t+h /(u′(rνt )νrν−1t ). The Euler
equation (17) becomes:
1 = [Γ(1− τ) + τ ]Et[wt+h] ⇐⇒ Et[wt+h] = [Γ− τ(Γ− 1)]−1 ≈ [1 + ρh(1− τ)]−1 (19)
Hence, in equilibrium managers’ effective discount rate equals the after-tax borrowing rate
(ignoring the effect of adjustment costs Ψt). Suppose that managers issue one extra dollar of
debt that will be repaid with interest at t + h. Eq. (19) implies that the managers see the
NPV of this debt issue as zero.12
E[wt+h] = [Γ− τ(Γ− 1)]−1 ⇐⇒ NPV = 1− E[wt+h] [Γ− τ(Γ− 1)] = 0 (20)
Yet the NPV of a marginal dollar of debt to shareholders equals NPV = 1−β [Γ− τ(Γ− 1)] =
τ(1− β) > 0, which is the standard interest tax shield.
The same reasoning works in reverse. Suppose tax shields are small and overmatched by
costs of debt (by way of Ψt > 0). Would the managers issue equity in order to pay down $1
million of debt? Not if the transaction started from the managers’ optimal path of rents. The
managers could issue α million of equity (or cut payout by α million) but would have to put
fraction of debt service comes out of managers’ future rents. (The fraction depends on how tight the governance
constraint is.) Thus a fraction of corporate debt amounts to borrowing on behalf of managers. Also managers
must co-invest when the firm’s capital stock expands, either by cutting back rents or by allocating their share
of additional borrowing to finance their share of investment. See Myers (2000) and Lambrecht and Myers
(2012) for a fuller discussions of corporate borrowing and co-investment.
12We thank one of the referees for pointing this out.
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up (1 − α)/(1 − τs) in the form of lower current rents.13 The managers could then increase
future rents, but the net effect, starting from their optimum, would decrease expected lifetime
utility.
These comments clarify how debt disciplines managers, even when there are no costs or
restrictions on the amount of cash raised by debt or equity issues (Ψt = 0). An increase in the
current level of debt reduces the future rents that the managers will extract, which in turn
leads managers to reduce immediate rents in order to moderate the reduction in future rents.
The discipline therefore comes from the effects of corporate borrowing on managers’ optimal
dynamic path of rents, which is smoothed. It is self-discipline, not discipline imposed by costs
or frictions in raising the cash required for immediate debt service.
Compare the expressions for h
∂rt+jh
∂Dt
and h
∂rt+jh
∂Kt
(for j = 0, 1) with the expressions between
square brackets in Eqs. (8) and (9). Assume the firm is worth more as a going concern. The
comparison shows that the marginal dollar increases due to a change in debt or investment
are the same as in the risk-neutral case up to a scaling factor 1/(1 − τs + ∂dt+jh
∂rt+jh
) = (1 −
α)/(1 − τs) (with ∂dt+jh
∂Dt
=
∂dt+jh
∂Kt
= 0 for j = 0, 1). The scaling factor is determined by the
tax deductibility of managers’ rents (payouts to the investors are not tax deductible) and by
the degree of investor protection α. The governance constraint requires that managers get
the fraction (1−α)/(1− τs) of each dollar of additional borrowing, with shareholders getting
the remaining fraction. A dollar more paid for debt service reduces rents by (1− α)/(1− τs)
dollars. Thus the marginal utility of a dollar of debt or debt service equals (1 − α)/(1 − τs)
times the marginal utility of rent extraction.
The expressions for h
∂rt+jh
∂Dt
and h
∂rt+jh
∂Kt
(for j = 0, 1) are different for the regime in which
investors would close the firm, because in that case
∂dt+jh
∂Dt
6= 0 and ∂dt+jh
∂Kt
6= 0 for j = 0, 1.
The level of debt and capital stock now has a direct effect on current payout to shareholders
13 There are no information problems or other frictions in our model that would deter equity issues. The
managers abstain in this example because it is not in their interest to issue equity.
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and also an effect on next period’s payout if there are adjustment costs (∂Ψt+h/∂Dt 6= 0
or ∂Ψt+h/∂Kt 6= 0). We discuss this in detail in the next section where we have explicit
expressions for rt in each regime.
We conclude this section by examining the effect of the governance constraint on managers’
rents. Let Rt denote the market value of rents, Rt = Et
[∑∞
j=0 β
jhrt+jh
]
. The budget
constraint Eq. (15) and Eq. (6) require that:
Rt + St = Vt − (Γ(1− τ) + τ)Dt−h + Tt + τsRt ≡ Ft + τsRt (21)
In addition to a debt taxshield Tt, the firm also has a rent tax shield τsRt. Shareholders
cannot recoup the rent tax shield if they intervene, because intervention eliminates rents, as
is clear from the governance constraint Eq. (11).
The effects of corporate taxes on rents and stock market value may be positive or negative.
Higher taxes reduce shareholders’ going concern value, Ft, but also create a rent tax shield
that allows managers to lever up rents by a factor 1/(1− τs). The latter effect may dominate
for high tax rates. We return to these issues in more detail in the next section.
Rearranging Eq. (21) and substituting St by the governance constraint gives:
Rt = min
[
(1− α)Ft
1− τs ,
Ft − αNt
1− τs
]
(22)
The first and second argument of the min operator give the market value of managers’ rents
if shareholders would operate (Ft ≥ Nt) or liquidate (Ft < Nt) the firm. The cost of collective
action (α < 1) creates space for managers to continue the firm when it ought to be closed
down (Nt > Ft > αNt), but managers’ rents are squeezed as the going concern value drops
further below liquidation value. Managers wait too long to close the firm but have to sacrifice
rents for doing so.
We now move to a closed-form version of the general model.
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3 A closed form solution
To solve the model explicitly we need to specify the utility (u) and cost (Ψt) functions, the
time increment (h) and the stochastic process (pit) that generates the return on investment.
We assume in this section that managers have power utility (constant relative risk aversion
or CRRA), with u(rν) = (r
ν)1−η
1−η ≡ ν r
γ
γ
, where 0 < η (and η 6= 1) and 0 < ν < 1 and
γ ≡ (1− η)ν.14 The return on risky assets, pit, is given by the following process:
pit h =
(
µ− σ
2
2
)
h + σt
√
h where t ∼ i.i.d. N(0, 1) (23)
where µ is defined net of capital depreciation but before production costs are subtracted.
Hence pit follows a diffusion process in continuous time as h → 0. Investment opportunities,
which are defined by µ and σ, are assumed known and constant.
We assume that Ψt represents the firm’s production cost, with Ψt ≡ hφKt
(
Kt
Nt
)θ−1
. We
assume θ > 1, so that the instantaneous net return on capital decreases with investment
(decreasing instantaneous returns to scale). This cost function is required in order to have
a bounded investment policy for the first-best, risk-neutral benchmark. The cost function is
not essential for managers’ optimization problem.15
To solve the problem in continuous time, we first derive the continuous-time equivalent of
the governance constraints in proposition 1. Taking the continuous-time limit h→ 0 by using
L’Hoˆpital’s rule gives the following proposition:
Proposition 2 The continuous-time version of the governance constraint is as follows. If it
14The limiting case η = 1 corresponds to log utility. The plots in Figures 1 and 2 below show that the
solution is numerically well behaved in the neighborhood of η = 1, so we do not present analytical solutions
for this limiting case.
15We assume that the firm can buy or sell the risky assets K and issue or retire debt with no frictions or
adjustment costs. We comment on adjustment costs below.
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would be optimal for shareholders to keep the firm alive then
dt =
(
α
1− α
)
rt(1− τs) ≡ αmrt where m ≡ 1− τs
1− α (24)
If it would be optimal for shareholders to liquidate the firm then
dt =
(
α
1− α
){
rt(1− τs) + Kt (ρ− µ(1− τ)) − ρτDt + (1− τ)φKt
(
Kt
Nt
)θ−1}
(25)
The key state variable for managers’ optimization problem is the firm’s net worth worth, Nt,
which includes accumulated retained earnings. The budget constraint Eq. (3) implies:
Nt+h −Nt = Kt
[
epit+hh (1− τ) + τ − 1] − Dt [eρh(1− τ) + τ − 1]
− hrt(1− τs) − hdt − h(1− τ)φKt
(
Kt
Nt
)θ−1
(26)
By using L’Hoˆpital’s rule the continuous-time limit (h→ 0) can be expressed as a stochastic
differential equation. Also in continuous time the budget constraint Eq. (3) implies that
Dt = Kt −Nt. The process for net worth is therefore:
dNt =
[(
µ∗ − ρ∗ − φ∗
(
Kt
Nt
)θ−1)
Kt + ρ
∗Nt − (1− τs)rt − dt
]
dt + σ∗Kt dz (27)
where µ∗ ≡ µ(1− τ), ρ∗ ≡ ρ(1− τ), σ∗ ≡ σ(1− τ), φ∗ ≡ φ(1− τ), and dz is a Wiener process.
Payout and rents act as a drain on the growth of net worth Nt. Once investment (Kt)
and total payout (rt plus dt) are set, net debt (Dt) follows from the budget constraint. Three
different regimes are possible for the net worth process Nt (described by Eq. (27)), depending
on which of the governance constraints determines payout (dt) and rents (rt). The regimes
correspond to the case where shareholders would keep the firm as a going concern (regime i
= 1, with Ft > Nt), close it down (regime i = 3, with Ft < Nt) or be indifferent between
continuation and closure (regime i = 2, with Ft = Nt).
In the going-concern regime 1, where St = αFt and therefore Rt = Ft/m, dt and rt
move in lockstep according to Eq. (24). In the liquidation regime 3, where St = αNt and
Rt = (Ft − αNt)/(1− τs) < Nt/m, dt and rt move in lockstep according to Eq. (25).
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It is also possible that both the going-concern and the liquidation constraint bind simul-
taneously (St = αNt and Rt = Nt/m) and that Ft = Nt so that shareholders would not care
whether the firm continues or is liquidated. Payout still moves in lockstep with rents according
to Eq. (24) but managers set Kt at a level such that Ft = Nt. Managers’ investment policy
Kt in this regime is the solution to:
Kt(ρ− µ(1− τ)) − ρτDt + (1− τ)φKt
(
Kt
Nt
)θ−1
= 0 (28)
We can now formulate managers’ optimization problem. They set rents rt and investment Kt
to optimize:
M(N0) = max
rt,Kt
E0
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt
νrγt
γ
dt
]
(29)
subject to the transversality condition limt→∞E
[
e−δtM(Nt)
]
= 0 and the intertemporal bud-
get constraint Eq. (27), which incorporates according to the prevailing regime the relevant
governance constraint given in proposition 2. The transversality condition ensures that the
integral converges. This optimization problem is closely related to the well-known portfolio-
consumption problem (see the seminal papers by Merton (1969, 1971)). The solution (see
appendix for the derivation) is:
Proposition 3 The optimal investment policy (Kit), rent policy (rit), debt policy (Dit) and
managers’ lifetime utility (Mit) for regime i are:
ki
[
µ − ρ − φθ
(
Kit
Nt
)θ−1]
= (1− γ)σ∗2
(
Kit
Nt
)
for i = 1, 3 (30)
(
K2t
Nt
)
(1− τ)
[
µ − ρ − φ
(
K2t
Nt
)θ−1]
= ρτ for i = 2 (31)
rit =
(
mbi
ν
) 1
γ−1
Nt ≡ qiNt for i = 1, 2, 3 (32)
Dit = (li − 1) Nt for i = 1, 2, 3 (33)
Mit = bi
Nγt
γ
for i = 1, 2, 3 (34)
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The constant bi is the solution to:
m
(
mbi
ν
) 1
γ−1 (1− γ)
γ
+ ρni − δ
γ
+ ki
(
µ− ρ − φ liθ−1
)
li +
1
2
σ∗2(γ−1) li2 = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3
(35)
where li = lit ≡ KitNt and li is the solution to (30) for i = 1, 3 and to (31) for i = 2, and where
k1 ≡ 1 − τ , k2 ≡ 0, k3 ≡ 1−τ1−α , n1 ≡ 1 − τ , n2 ≡ 1, and n3 ≡ 1−α−τ1−α . The regime under
which managers operate does not depend on the level of the state variable Nt, and regime
switching therefore does not occur.
The firm’s financial policies depend on whether it is worth strictly more alive than dead and
therefore on whether it has high or low after-tax profits. Profitability depends on several
parameters, but not on the level of the state variable Nt. Since Ft is proportional to Nt (see
corollary 1), the ratio Ft/Nt must be constant.
The firm never switches regime when expected profitability is constant. As Nt drops, the
firm shrinks and becomes a miniature, but otherwise identical, version of its previous self. If
the firm’s fortunes deteriorate and Nt falls, then investment, debt, payout and rents all shrink
proportionally, since Kt = liNt, rt = qitNt and Dt = (li − 1)Nt.
There are critical profitability rates µˆ and µ (µˆ > µ) that determine the three possible
regimes. Since the going concern value Ft is increasing in µ, these rates are the solutions to
F1t(Nt; µˆ) = Nt and F3t(Nt;µ) = Nt, or equivalently (see proof to proposition 3):
ρτ = (1− τ) [(µˆ− ρ)l1 − φlθ1] and ρτ = (1− τ) [(µ− ρ)l3 − φlθ3] (36)
Regime 1 (3) corresponds with high (low) profitability rates. Of course, the profitability rate
is not the only parameter that could determine the three regimes. If we fix µ but vary the
tax rate τ then (36) could be solved for τˆ and τ . The same three regimes would occur, with
regime 1 (3) coinciding with low (high) tax rates.
Managers’ investment policy deviates from what shareholders would do if they were in
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charge. One can show (see online appendix A) that there exists a critical profitability rate µo
such that shareholders adopt the first-best investment policy, lo (which can be obtained by
setting γ = 1 in Eq. (30)) for µ ≥ µo and shareholders close the firm for µ < µo. Furthermore,
µo < µ, which means that the first-best closure region corresponds to profitability rates that
are sufficiently low and within regime 3. Inefficiently late closure by managers therefore only
occurs in regime 3, and this for a range of sufficiently low profitability rates.
Shareholders would only want to finance the firm in the first place if µ > µo. However, a
firm could start, say, in regime 1 but end up in another because of some unanticipated change,
for example a hike in the tax rate or a drop in expected profitability.
We will focus on regimes 1 and 3, which include most of our model’s economic insights. A
more detailed discussion of regime 2 is in online appendix C.
3.1 Investment
The optimal investment policy implies a constant ratio of capital to net worth, with li =
Kit/Nt. The first-order conditions that pin down li for regime 1 and 3 (see equation (30)) only
differ by a constant factor ki, where k1 = 1−τ and k3 = (1−τ)/(1−α). Therefore investment
is higher relative to net worth in regime 3 than in regime 1, for the same profitability rate µ
and production-cost function Ψ. (Of course the firm can only be in one particular regime for
given values of µ and Ψ.) In regime 1, managers are in effect co-owners of the firm, splitting
going concern value Ft with shareholders. The shareholders get the fraction α and managers
1 − α. But in regime 3, where the shareholders would close the firm down, the shareholders
have a fixed claim worth αNt. The managers become the only residual claimants and so have
an incentive to invest more.
Equation (30) reveals how managers’ CAPEX decison depends on the parameters σ and γ
in regimes 1 and 3. Recall that γ ≡ (1−η)ν acts as a modified coefficient of risk aversion that
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also depends on the increasing marginal cost of rent extraction (ν). Higher return volatility (σ)
or risk aversion (η > 0) and decreasing returns to rent extraction (ν < 1) reduce investment.
Since ν affects investment only through γ (see equation (30)) decreasing returns from rent
extraction has the same effect on investment as increasing risk aversion.
Managers’ personal rate of time preference δ does not affect investment.16 CAPEX in-
creases with the expected return on risky capital (µ) and decreases with the safe rate of
interest (ρ).17 CAPEX always falls short of its first best value-maximizing level.
Taxes reduce the after-tax return, but (assuming losses are tax deductible) also reduce
volatility (σ∗ ≡ σ(1−τ)). Lower returns decrease investment whereas lower volatility increases
investment. The reduced volatility dominates: A higher tax rate reduces the risk borne by
managers, so the net effect of taxes on investment is positive.18
3.2 Payout and rents
Optimal rents are a linear function of the firm’s net worth, with rit = qiNt for all regimes.
The governance constraint determines payout to shareholders as d1t = αmq1Nt in regime 1,
where the firm is valued solely as a going concern. In regimes 2 and 3, where going-concern
value is less than or equal to liquidation value, dit = α (ρ− gi) Nt, where gi is the drift of the
16The first order condition for investment, as given by equation (59), depends on the derivatives M ′(N) and
M ′′(N) which in turn depend on managers’ time preference rate δ through the constant b. While the constant
b can be factored out with power utility (and negative exponential utility see below), this may not be true in
general.
17But CAPEX actually decreases with µ in regime 2. Higher profitability decreases the amount of CAPEX
needed to keep the going-concern governance constraint binding. See online appendix C for further details.
18Substitute k1 ≡ 1− τ or k3 ≡ 1−τ1−α and σ∗2 ≡ σ2(1− τ)2 in Eq. (30). Divide through by 1− τ . The only
net effect of taxes is to reduce σ2 by the factor 1− τ . Lower risk means more investment.
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net worth process Nt, with:
dN =
[
ki
(
µ− ρ − φ liθ−1
)
li + ρ ni −mqi
]
Ndt + σ∗liNdz for i = 1, 2, 3 (37)
≡ giN dt + σiN Ndz for i = 1, 2, 3 (38)
Thus Nt follows a geometric Brownian motion and takes on positive values only. The
absence of jumps in Nt combined with power utility (and therefore u
′(0) = +∞) guarantees
that rents and payout remain positive and debt is risk-free (Nt = Kt − Dt > 0).
Rents and payout are smoothed, because they depend on the firm’s cumulative retained
income Nt, rather than current income.
We can now calculate the market value of the managers’ rents and shareholders’ equity.
The market values are Rt = Et
[∫∞
t
e−ρyry dy
]
and St = Et
[∫∞
t
e−ρydy dy
]
. Since Nt follows
a geometric Brownian motion, the integrals are well known.
Corollary 1 Debt is risk-free with market value Dit = (li − 1)Nt. The market value of man-
agers’ rents (Rit), shareholders’ equity (Sit) and total value to managers as well as shareholders
(Fit = Sit + (1− τs)Rit) are:
R1t =
q1Nt
ρ− g1 >
(1−α)Nt
1−τs R2t =
q2Nt
ρ− g2 =
(1−α)Nt
1−τs R3t =
q3Nt
ρ− g3 <
(1−α)Nt
1−τs
S1t =
αmq1Nt
ρ− g1 S2t = αNt S3t = αNt
Fit > Nt F2t = Nt F3t < Nt
The growth condition ρ > gi ensures that market values are positive and bounded.
In regime 1, going-concern value exceeds liquidation value (Ft > Nt), and the values of
shareholders’ equity and rents depend on total going-concern value. Shareholders’ total going-
concern value, Ft, captures the expected present value of the firm’s future net income, but
excluding the rent tax shield.
In regime 2, managers increase investment to ensure that the going concern value equals
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the liquidation value (Ft = Nt). Shareholders have no incentive to intervene (S2t = αNt). R2t
exceeds (1− α)Nt because managers benefit from the rent tax shield.
In regime 3, the firm is worth more dead than alive from shareholders’ point of view (Ft <
Nt). To prevent the firm from being closed, managers sacrifice enough of their rents to keep
shareholders at bay. While this causes managers’ claim R3t to drop below (1−α)Nt/(1− τs),
this does not mean that Rt itself decreases, because higher taxes boost the rent tax shield,
τsRt, which loosens the governance constraint (recall from the governance constraint that
rents are scaled by a factor 1/(1− τs)). This positive effect on managers’ rents can outweigh
the negative effect that corporate taxes have on profits.19 Corollary 1 allows us to calculate
the rent and payout yield.
Corollary 2 The payout and rent yields are constant over time, with:
dit
Sit
=
rit
Rit
= ρ− gi (39)
Payout and rents are a constant fraction ρ− gi of the market values of equity (St) and rents
(Rt). Equity value is determined by the firm’s continuation value Ft in regime 1 and its
liquidation value (net worth) Nt in regimes 2 and 3. Rents are a residual claim and therefore
depend on Ft in all three regimes. Since Ft is determined by the present value of current
and future net income, rents can be said to depend on the firm’s permanent income. While
permanent income is determined by current and future income, it is indirectly also based on
past retained income. The firm’s current income is a function of its net worth Nt = Kt − Dt,
which in turn is determined by the firm’s past retained earnings. Thus Nt could be viewed
as a payout reservoir. For example, John and Kalay (1982) report that many firms have debt
covenants that link dividends to cumulative retained earnings, forbidding firms to pay out
income not yet earned.
19These relationships appear in Figure 1 of the online appendix D.
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Managers could choose to deplete this reservoir all at once by liquidating the firm’s capital
stock and paying out what is left after paying off the debt Dt. This is what shareholders would
do when Ft < Nt if they were in charge. But managers distribute payout as a continuous flow
instead. Thus payout and rents are a constant drain on the reservoir of retained earnings.
Since payout and rents are linked to cumulative retained income (a stock variable) and not
current income (a flow variable), payout and rents are smooth relative to the firm’s net income.
Rents depend on the various model parameters through the constant bi. Note, for example,
that (unlike investment policy) rent and payout policies depend on managers’ personal rate
of time preference δ. A higher δ makes managers more impatient and increases rents.
3.3 Debt policy
The firm’s net debt level is a linear function of its net worth, with Dt = (li − 1)Nt. The
optimal net debt level is negative if li < 1, which may happen for low tax rates, high levels of
risk aversion and high investment return volatility (see Figure 2 in section 3.4 below). A firm
with negative debt has more cash than debt. It is equivalent to an all-equity financed firm
that has invested an amount Kt in risky projects and an amount Nt − Kt = (1 − li)Nt > 0
in cash. As the firm’s fortunes improve, the firm increases the dollar amount of cash it holds
and its stock of risky investments. If li > 1 then the firm has a positive amount of debt. This
happens for higher tax rates (see Figure 2 below). Thus higher tax rates do increase corporate
borrowing, even though managers do not exploit interest tax shields fully. An increase in the
firm’s net worth raises the firm’s amount of debt and its stock of capital.
We can now calculate the firm’s leverage under the optimal investment and payout policy.
With negative debt the traditional leverage ratio is hard to interpret. Lambrecht and Pawlina
(2013) provide an economic rationale for using the net debt ratio (NDR) as defined below:
Corollary 3 Define the firm’s net debt ratio as NDRt ≡ DtSt +Rt + I Dt where I = 1 if Dt ≥ 0
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and I = 0 if Dt < 0. The NDR is constant over time and given by:
NDRit =
(li − 1)
Pi + I (li − 1) where P1 ≡
αmq1 + q1
ρ − g1 , P2 ≡ α+
1− α
1− τs andP3 ≡ α+
q3
ρ − g3
The firm has an optimal target net debt ratio, similar to the leverage target predicted by
the tradeoff theory of capital structure. However, in the presence of taxes and the absence
of bankruptcy costs the standard tradeoff theory of capital structure predicts 100% debt
financing. Our model predicts a significantly lower leverage level because of managers’ desire
to smooth rents. Higher managerial risk aversion and lower corporate taxes lead to a lower
NDR. (See Figure 2 below.)
With power utility, decisions about debt, rents, payout and CAPEX cannot be separated;
none is independent of the others. The firm responds to positive demand shocks by financing
increased CAPEX with a combination of additional borrowing and retained earnings. It
responds to negative shocks by selling off assets and paying down debt. Payout and rents
respond to demand shocks, but slowly, because they depend on cumulative income, not current
income.
3.4 Examples
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate how going-concern value, CAPEX, rents (and therefore payout) and
capital structure depend on profitablity, risk aversion and the tax rate. We plot results for
two different levels of volatility (σ).
Panel A of Figure 1 shows that the ratio of going-concern value to net worth increases with
µ, the expected rate of return on CAPEX. The ratio is less than 1.0 in the low-profit regime
3 (on the left). The ratio equals 1.0 exactly in regime 2 (between µ = 0.108 and 0.112 for
σ = 0.2), where both the going-concern and liquidation constraints are binding. As µ increases
in the high-profit regime 1, the growth rate g of net worth rises and value increases rapidly.20
20Value explodes as the growth rate g of net worth approaches the cost of capital ρ. The explosion is a
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Raising volatility from 0.2 (solid line) to 0.4 (dashed line) decreases the going concern value.
Panel B plots the optimal ratio of the capital stock to net worth. The expected return µ
must exceed ρ for managers to invest at all. The capital to net worth ratio increases rapidly as
µ moves above about 0.08. But the ratio declines with µ in the intermediate regime 2 where
the capital to net worth ratio is determined entirely by the governance constraint. Growth of
the ratio resumes in the high-profitability regime 3. Increasing the volatility of the return on
investment from σ = 0.2 (solid line) to σ = 0.4 (dashed line) reduces the stock of capital.
Panel C shows that the ratio of rents to net worth declines with expected profitability. As
µ increases, the firm’s growth rate g increases and managers prefer to sacrifice current rents
in favor of future growth. But the levels of rents and payout increase as net worth grows.
Higher volatility reduces the growth rate and increases the ratio of rents to net worth.
The optimal NDR (panel D) increases with the expected profitability in regimes 1 and 3.
For sufficiently low µ, CAPEX = 0 (l3 = 0) and the firm keeps all its net worth in cash. This
explains why the NDR drops to -1.0 as µ decreases towards ρ. As µ rises further above ρ,
the firm invests some of its net worth in its capital stock and the remainder in cash. Once
the NDR exceeds 0, the firm invests all its net worth plus borrowing in its capital stock.
Comparing plots B and D shows that investment and financing move in tandem: a higher
capital to net worth ratio corresponds to a higher NDR. The NDR falls in the intermediate
regime 2 exactly in sync with the fall in the capital stock.
Panels A and C in Figure 2 illustrate the effects of corporate taxes. Panel A plots the
optimal capital to net worth ratio, which increases monotonically with the tax rate. (Recall
that the net effect of taxes is higher CAPEX, because higher taxes reduce the risk borne by
managers.) The solution converges to the first-best investment level (relative to net worth)
feature of all valuation models with cash flows growing at a constant expected rate. Our solution requires
g < ρ.
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lo = 6.55 as τ → 1 and therefore σ∗ → 0. Managers’ optimal levels of capital stock are less
than half their first-best levels for plausible tax rates, however. A more volatile return on
investment (higher σ) reduces investment.
The optimal NDR (panel C) increases with the corporate tax rate due to a higher capital
to net worth ratio and the tax deductibility of interest. Higher volatility reduces leverage.
For σ = 0.4, the NDR is negative for corporate tax rates up 35%. For tax rate rates below
20% the NDR is about -0.4, indicating that 40% of the firm’s (all-equity financed) assets are
invested in cash, and the remainder in risky assets.
Panels B and D illustrate the effects of managers’ coefficient of risk aversion η on managers’
investment and financing policies, respectively. Recall that η = 0 means risk neutrality; higher
values for η imply higher risk aversion.21 The figure confirms that the optimal capital to net
worth ratio and the NDR decrease with η. Both the investment and financing policies are
independent of risk aversion in regime two, where policies are determined by risk-neutral
shareholders’ governance constraint. (Regime 2 arises for 1.081 < η < 3.1 if σ = 0.2 and for
0.085 < η < 13.1 if σ = 0.4.) Our model generates a low or even negative NDR for a wide
range of the risk-aversion coefficient.
The returns to scale on rent extraction, ν, affects investment and capital structure through
γ. Reducing ν has a similar effect as increasing the coefficient of risk aversion, η. If we fix
η = 0.2 and put 1 − ν on the X-axis (with ν ∈ [0, 1]), then plots B and D in Figure 2 would
remain the same for the parameter range ν ∈ [0, 1]. Of course, the plots would be right
truncated, since ν takes on a narrower range of values than η.
21The first best investment policy is not achieved for η = 0 if there are decreasing returns to rent extraction
(ν = 0.8 < 1). First-best investment requires γ = (1− η)ν = 1.
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3.5 Adjustment costs
We now briefly consider how adjustment costs could affect debt and investment policies.
Online appendix B contains further details.
With power utility the optimal policy implies that, in the absence of adjustment costs,
the ratio of net debt to risky capital is kept at a constant target level through constant
rebalancing ( yt ≡ Dt/Kt = (l − 1)/l). Suppose now that the firm incurs proportional
adjustment costs when adjusting its capital stock and when borrowing or paying down debt.
Keeping yt constant is clearly no longer optimal: adjustment costs would explode as the firm
tried to follow fluctuations of investment returns in continuous time. Constantinides (1986)
and Davis and Norman (1990), among others, show that for portfolio-investment problems
with proportional transaction costs, it is optimal to keep the ratio yt within an interval [y, y].
As long as yt is within this interval, managers would not intervene and would let Dt and Kt
freely fluctuate. When yt hits y, managers would sell risky assets and use the net proceeds to
pay down debt. When yt hits y, managers would borrow and expand investment. Managers’
value function M(Dt, Kt) is homogenous in D and K and therefore M(Dt, Kt) = K
γ
t J(yt).
The optimal rent policy is the solution to the first order condition νrγ−1t = −mMD.
The location of the range for the debt ratio depends on the same parameters that determine
the target debt ratio with no adjustment costs. For example, the range shifts up for higher
tax rates and down for increased risk aversion.
Shreve and Soner (1994) analyze the portfolio-consumption problem with proportional
transaction costs and power utility. They show that, regardless of the model parameters, the
proportion of net worth (wealth) held in the risky asset in the optimal portfolio remains in an
interval with end points that depend on all the model parameters but not on net worth. They
also show that the Merton (zero transaction cost) solution does not always lie within this
optimal interval. This can happen when one endpoint of this interval involves leverage (i.e.,
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the optimal portfolio borrows at the risk free rate to invest in the risky asset). In particular,
Shreve and Soner (1994) show that “when leverage is optimal, the presence of transaction
costs reduces the agent’s desire for leverage, and the agent should trade to move from the
Merton proportion to a less leveraged position.” It appears, therefore, that adjustment costs
for debt can move the debt-ratio range downward.
3.6 Summary
This section’s closed-form solution assumes managers with CRRA utility, decreasing returns
to CAPEX, tax-deductible interest and rents, but no financial frictions or financial market
imperfections. We recap results here.
1. Decisions about CAPEX, debt, rents and payout are all tied to net worth, that is, to
cumulative retained income and equity investment. No decision is independent of the
others.
2. Payout and rents move in lockstep. They are smoothed because they depend on cu-
mulative equity income, not on current income. The level of payout and rents depend
on whether shareholders would continue the firm as a going concern or shut it down.
Higher tax rates increase rents when rents are tax-deductible.
3. The optimal level of capital investment depends on profitability (+), managers’ risk
aversion (-), managers’ cost of rent extraction (-), volatility (-) and the tax rate (+,
because a higher tax rate reduces risk to managers). Managers underinvest relative to
value-maximizing CAPEX. CAPEX does not depend on managers’ personal rate of time
preference.
4. Managers may continue to keep the firm alive when profitability is low and assets should
be liquidated (regime 3). They overinvest in bad times, not in good times.
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5. There is an optimal net debt ratio that depends on the tax rate (+), volatility (-),
managers’ risk aversion (-) and costs of rent extraction (-). The optimal ratio can be
negative. Debt is safe because it is paid down to maintain the optimal debt ratio when
the firm encounters hard times. The value of interest tax shields is not fully exploited.
Traditional tradeoff theories of capital structure face difficulties in generating low or neg-
ative leverage without assuming unrealistically high bankruptcy costs. But low leverage
is a fact of life. For example, Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) report that the median firm
in Compustat has a negative net debt ratio. Our model can easily capture negative net
debt ratios without assuming any bankruptcy costs, adjustment costs or imperfections
in financial markets.
4 What happens when managers have CARA utility?
We now consider how our results so far depend on the specification of managers’ utility
function. It turns out that substituting a plausible alternative function can change managers’
financial policies dramatically.
Suppose that managers have negative exponential utility, with u(r) = u − e−ηr, where
u is managers’ maximum achievable utility in any given period. This means managers have
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). We assume for simplicity that there are constant
returns to scale to investment (θ = 1) and rent extraction (ν = 1).
With CARA utility, the firm’s net worth could become negative, which raises the spectre
of insolvency and default. Modeling default would add a heavy layer of complexity, rule out a
closed-form solution and confuse a comparison of results from the CRRA model. Therefore we
assume here that the firm’s debt is subject to a net worth covenant, which allows bondholders
to liquidate the firm as soon as net worth Nt reaches zero. At that point, the firm’s debt Dt
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equals exactly the firm’s capital Kt. Since net worth follows a diffusion process (no jumps),
the covenant ensures that debt remains safe. Shareholders get nothing in liquidation (S(Nt =
0) = 0) and managers fall back on their life-time reservation utility value M(N = 0) = U .
Finally, we assume that shareholders who intervene and throw out the managers can only
run the firm as a going concern. This allows us to compare results to the going-concern regime
1 in the CRRA model.
Managers optimize M(N0) = max{rt,Kt}E0
[∫∞
0
e−δtu(rt)dt
]
subject to the transversal-
ity condition limt→∞E
[
e−δtM(Nt)
]
= 0, the value matching condition M(0) = U and the
intertemporal budget constraint:
dNt = [(µ
∗ − ρ∗)Kt + ρ∗Nt − mrt] dt + σ∗Ktdz ≡ g dt + σN dz (40)
This gives the following proposition.
Proposition 4 With negative exponential utility managers’ optimal investment Kt, rent rt,
and debt Dt policies for net worth Nt > 0 are:
Kt =
(µ∗ − ρ∗)(1− τs)
ηρ∗σ∗2(1− α) =
(µ − ρ)(1− τs)
ηρσ2(1− α)(1− τ)2 ≡ K (41)
rt =
ρ∗(1− α)
(1− τs) Nt +
(δ − ρ∗)
ηρ∗
+
(µ∗ − ρ∗)2
2ηρ∗σ∗2
(42)
Dt = K − Nt (43)
Investment policy is independent of the firm’s net debt Dt and net worth Nt. Managers’
lifetime utility under the optimal policies is:
M(Nt) =
u
δ
− be− η(1−α)ρ
∗
(1−τs) Nt for Nt > 0 where : (44)
b =
1
ρ∗
e
− 1
ρ∗
[
δ−ρ∗ + 1
2
(µ∗ − ρ∗)2
σ∗2
]
(45)
At Nt = 0 bondholders close the firm and receive K. Shareholders receive nothing and man-
agers receive their lifetime reservation utility, which has been set at U ≡ u
δ
− b.22
22Solving the problem for a general U is messy at best, because rents depend on U in a complicated way
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Managers’ utility function has an important effect on CAPEX. With CRRA, the firm’s capital
stock is constant relative to net worth, but with CARA utility the firm’s capital stock is a
constant absolute dollar amount.
The optimal net debt ratio is constant with CRRA utility. This is not the case with CARA
utility:
Proposition 5 The market value of managers’ rents Rt, outside equity St and debt Dt are:
Rt = A0 + A1Nt − A0 eλNt (46)
St = αmRt (47)
Dt = K − Nt (48)
where λ is the negative root of the characteristic equation 1
2
σ2N λ
2 + g λ − ρ = 0. The
firm’s net debt ratio is:
NDRt =
Dt
St + Rt + DtId
=
K − Nt(
1−ατs
1−α
)
[A0 + A1Nt − A0eλN ] + (K −Nt) Id
(49)
where Id = 1 if Dt ≥ 0 and Id = 0 if Dt < 0. The constants A0 and A1 are given in the
appendix.
With CARA utility, the NDR decreases from 1 to − (1−τs)
(1−ατs)(1−τ) as Nt increases from 0 to +∞.
Net debt declines with the firm’s net worth, and for sufficiently high levels of Nt (Nt > K),
the firm has a net cash position.
We now discuss in more detail the firm’s investment, payout and financing policies and
compare these with the policies we obtained for managers with power utility.
(see Karatzas, Lehoczky, Sethi, and Shreve (1986)). To obtain an explicit solution we set U at the level for
which managers’ abandonment option has zero value when creditors force closure at Nt = 0. This neutralizes
the effects of U on the solution.
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4.1 Investment policy
With exponential utility, the investment policy is independent of Nt, Dt and the firm’s fi-
nancing policy. The stock of capital is constant when expected profitability is constant. The
capital stock therefore declines as a fraction of net worth when net worth increases. There is a
similar result in the portfolio-consumption literature, which shows that the portfolio decision
does not depend on the investor’s net worth with CARA utility. This is one of the reasons
why exponential utility has been a popular choice (see Campbell and Viceira (2002) for a
review).
With power utility, by contrast, the stock of capital is linked to net worth. High (low)
investment returns cause the firm to scale up (down) its stock of capital. Investment, debt
and net worth move together in the same direction: an increase (decrease) in the stock of
capital coincides with an increase (decrease) in the amount of debt Dt and net worth Nt.
4.2 Payout policy
With CARA utility, rents and payout include a variable and a fixed component. The variable
component is a constant fraction of net worth, which depends on the after-tax cost of capital
ρ∗. The fixed component is positive, but decreases with the cost of capital, risk aversion and
volatility. Risk aversion therefore reduces the fixed component and encourages managers to
save for a rainy day. The fixed component increases with the expected return on capital and
managers’ discount rate. A higher personal discount rate makes managers less patient and
leads to higher rents and payout.
The fixed component is paid out no matter how low Nt drops, which means that rents and
payout remain strictly positive down to the point where the firm is closed down by lenders
– a possible explanation for managers’ reluctance to cut (rents and) dividends in bad times.
With CARA utility, rents and payout are no longer a constant proportion of net worth. The
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marginal propensity to pay rents out of net worth is q with CRRA and ρ∗(1 − α)/(1 − τs)
with CARA. The marginal propensity for CARA is typically much smaller than for CRRA.23
This lower marginal propensity, combined with a positive fixed rent and payout component,
implies that CARA utility generates more rent and payout smoothing than CRRA.
4.3 Debt policy
Since Dt = Kt − Nt and Kt = K is constant with CARA utility, debt and net worth are
negatively related. Managers do not disinvest as net worth drops. Substituting the optimal
investment and payout policies into the intertemporal budget constraint (40), the net worth
process is an arithmetic Brownian motion:
dNt =
m
ηρ∗
[
(µ∗ − ρ∗)2
2σ∗2
− δ + ρ∗
]
dt + σ∗K dzt (50)
In the CARA model, cross-sectional differences in debt levels persist indefinitely.24 Suppose
firms 1 and 2 start off with debt levels D10 and D20 at time t = 0. The firms are otherwise
identical and absorb the same shocks. The difference in their debt levels will remain constant,
i.e. D1t −D2t = D10 −D20. This persistence result is a possible explanation of the empirical
findings of Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008).
With CARA utility, debt and profitability are negatively related, as in the pecking order
theory of capital structure. The most successful firms pay down debt and accumulate cash.
Unsuccessful firms run cash deficits and accumulate more and more debt to cover CAPEX,
payout and rents. With CRRA we get the opposite behavior: Successful firms increase the
23For example: Using the parameter values for Figure 1, the marginal propensity for CARA is ρ∗(1−α)/(1−
τs) = 0.0055, much less than the marginal propensities for regime 1 plotted in Figure 1C for CRRA.
24We know from (49) that the NDR is not constant, but depends on net worth Nt. Since Nt depends on the
initial level of net worth N0, the NDR depends on N0 also. Since Dt = K −Nt and Nt follows an arithmetic
Brownian motion, differences in debt remain forever, provided of course that firms are otherwise identical and
subject to the same shocks.
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stock of risky capital and finance CAPEX with retained earnings (higher Nt) and additional
debt. Unsuccessful firms disinvest and use some of the proceeds to repay debt. This causes
debt and profitability to be positively related, as in the standard trade-off theory.
With CRRA utility, firms have a constant net debt ratio. Investment, payout and debt
all move in lockstep. As a firm grows the dollar amount of risky capital, debt and payout
all rise in proportion. Thus small firms are scaled-down versions of their larger counterparts.
With CARA utility, small and large firms are very different. Small firms are riskier than large
firms, because they have a relatively larger amount of risky capital and more debt. They also
pay out more relative to net worth. Larger firms have less debt (or more cash) and a smaller
capital stock relative to net worth.
5 Empirical Implications and Conclusion
The first sentence of Hennessy and Whited (2007) reads “Corporate finance is primarily the
study of financing frictions.” But corporate finance is also the study of the financial behavior
of managers as agents for outside shareholders. We believe our model is the first dynamic
agency model that incorporates all three of the major corporate-finance decisions: investment,
borrowing and payout plus managerial rents. We assume rational, risk averse managers, who
make these decisions jointly in their long-run self interest, subject to a governance constraint,
and also subject to sources and uses of cash adding up in every period. We set aside financial-
market imperfections and financing frictions, except for corporate taxes. Therefore the dy-
namics of our model are driven by “pure agency.” Some of our results deserve further emphasis
and discussion.
Our general model (in Section 2) yields several empirical predictions, including:
1. Risk-averse managers invest less than the value-maximizing amount. However, they
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may keep a firm alive that ought to be shut down in order to continue extracting rents.
Shareholders’ cost of intervention permits managers to run firms that are worth more dead
than alive. One could call it overinvestment on the downside.
2. Managers smooth rents and payout, which evolve proportionally. Managers’ compen-
sation is tied to payout, similar to dividend unit plans in which executives are compensated
on the basis of dividends paid (see Smith and Watts (1982)). Payout and rents depend on
the firm’s cumulative retained income (net worth) which could be viewed as a payout “reser-
voir.” John and Kalay (1982) report that many firms have covenants that link dividends to
cumulative retained earnings.
3. Rent tax shields loosen the governance constraint and allow managers to increase rents
relative to payout.
4. Managers do not fully exploit interest tax shields, even though we introduce no financial
frictions. There is an optimal net debt ratio that is less than 100% and possibly even negative.
Our agency theory can generate realistic levels of leverage without having to assume financing
frictions or costs of financial distress.
The CRRA model set out in Section 3 predicts debt as a constant fraction of net worth –
a possible explanation for use of book, rather than market debt ratios in practice. But this
constant ratio is not pinned down by the usual tradeoff of the marginal values of interest tax
shields vs. costs of financial distress. The ratio comes from the managers’ joint optimization
of CAPEX, borrowing and rents and payout. In this model all these decisions interact; none
can be made separately from the others. For example, when net worth declines, managers cut
payout and sell some of the firm’s risky assets to pay down debt.
But the CARA model in Section 4 generates no stable debt ratio. Instead debt drifts up
or down depending on realized profitability, as in a pecking-order model of capital structure.
Profitable firms seek to pay down debt. Eventually they accumulate cash and become net
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lenders. Thus the CARA model can explain the ”cash mountains” accumulated by the most
successful corporations.
The contrast of results from our two closed-form models shows that the financial decisions
made by managers in a dynamic setting can change drastically depending on assumptions
about managers’ preferences. It is not just whether managers are risk-neutral or risk-averse.
The type or nature of risk aversion matters.
It is therefore important to know how managers’ risk aversion should be modeled. But
existing literature offers little or no guidance on this question. Many dynamic models assume
that managers seek to maximize market value, which sets agency issues aside and effectively
assumes that managers are risk-neutral. The dynamic agency models reviewed in Section 1
all assume risk-neutral managers. Theories from the field of organizational economics typi-
cally also assume risk neutrality.25 The literature on individual investors’ consumption-saving
decisions and portfolio choices assumes risk aversion, but deploys different utility functions,
including both power utility (e.g. Merton (1969, 1971), Constantinides (1986), Viceira (2001))
and negative exponential utility (e.g. Caballero (1990), Angeletos and Calvet (2005)). Absent
any guidance from prior work, we must leave the specification of managers’ preferences as an
important topic for investigation.
Of course our results apply to the mature, public firms that our model is designed for. The
predictions could change for firms with highly valuable growth options, for declining firms or
for firms facing material risks of financial distress or default (see e.g. Chen, Miao, and Wang
(2010)).
Extensions of our models could be informative (although the extensions may prevent
closed-form solutions). More complex and interesting governance constraints could be ex-
25Perusal of the Handbook of Organizational Economics by Gibbons and Roberts (2013) turned up no
references to models of preferences for teams or hierarchies of risk-averse managers. The typical assumption
is risk-neutrality. We thank Robert Gibbons for helpful discussion on this topic.
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plored. For example, the governance or sharing parameter α is probably not constant, but
higher once the firm has paid off debt and built up a net cash position. Managerial entrench-
ment comes from investment in specialized assets, not in cash.
Also our managers cannot claim all of NPV, because the fraction α must go to outside
shareholders. If, however, the NPV is linked to the managers’ human capital and therefore
lost if shareholders intervene, then managers could extract the NPV and finance all required
CAPEX by cutting back payout or issuing equity. Models built on this premise could help
distinguish the financial behavior of growth firms from the behavior of the mature firms
analyzed here.
Another open issue is top management compensation. By “top” we mean the CEO and his
or her immediate circle, not the much wider group of managers and employees that rents go
to. We treat this wider group as a de facto coalition. It is fair to ask how this coalition holds
together – see Acharya, Myers and Rajan (2011) for a possible answer – and how individual
managers’ preferences aggregate in the group.
6 Appendix
Proof of proposition 1
a) Case 1: Ft ≥ Nt (it is optimal for outside investors to keep the firm alive)
From the governance constraint (11), and the definitions for Vt and Tt (given by (5) and
42
(6) it follows that:
St = α
[
CF ∗t + Et
[ ∞∑
j=1
βj CF ∗t+jh
]
− (Γ(1− τ) + τ)Dt−h + Dt (1− β(Γ(1− τ) + τ))
]
+αEt
[ ∞∑
j=1
βj Dt+jh (1− β(Γ(1− τ) + τ))
]
= h dt + Et
[
Et+h
[ ∞∑
j=1
βj CF ∗t+jh
]]
− β(Γ(1− τ) + τ)Dt + Et
[
Et+h
∞∑
j=1
βj Dt+jh (1− β(Γ(1− τ) + τ))
]
(51)
⇐⇒ αCF ∗t − α(Γ(1− τ) + τ)Dt−h + αDt = h dt (52)
Replacing Dt into (52) by the budget equation Dt = Dt−1(Γ(1 − τ) + τ) − CF ∗t + h dt +
h rt (1− τs), and simplifying, gives equation (12) in proposition 1.
b) Case 2: Ft ≤ Nt (it is optimal for outside investors to keep the firm alive)
From the governance constraint (11) and the budget constraint (3) it follows that:
St = αNt = α [Kt + hdt + hrt(1− τs) + (1− τ)Ψ − Dt]
= hdt + βEt[St+h] = hdt + βα [Kt (Et[Πt+h](1− τ) + τ) − Dt (Γ(1− τ) + τ)] ⇐⇒
hdt =
(
α
(1− α)
)
{Kt [1− βEt[Πt+h](1− τ) − βτ ] + (1− τ)Ψt − τ(1− β)Dt + hrt(1− τs)}
Proof of proposition 2
Dividing the governance constraint (13) by h on both sides, taking expectations, and taking
the limit for h→ 0 gives:
dt =
α
(1− α) limh→0
[
rt(1− τs) + (1− τ)Ψt
h
+
Kt
[
1− (1− τ)e−ρheµh − τe−ρh] − τDt(1− e−ρh)
h
]
=
α
(1− α) limh→0
[
rt(1− τs) + (1− τ)Ψt
h
−Kt(µ− ρ)(1− τ)e(µ−ρ)h + ρτKte−ρh − ρτe−ρhDt
]
=
(
α
(1− α)
)[
rt(1− τs) + lim
h→0
(1− τ)Ψt
h
+ (ρ− µ(1− τ))Kt − ρτDt
]
Finally, substituting Ψt by the cost function hφKt
(
Kt
Nt
)θ−1
gives equation (25).
Proof of proposition 3
We first derive the process for the firm’s net worth process Nt under the 3 regimes.
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In regime 1 the governance constraint corresponds to dt = αmrt. Substituting into (27)
the process for Nt becomes:
dNt =
[
k1
(
µ− ρ − φ
(
K1t
Nt
)θ−1)
K1t + n1ρNt − mr1t
]
dt + σ∗K1t dz (53)
where k1 ≡ 1− τ and n1 ≡ 1− τ .
In regime 2 the governance constraint imposes the conditions dt = αmrt and Kt(ρ−µ(1−
τ)) − ρτDt + (1 − τ)φKt
(
Kt
Nt
)θ−1
= 0. The latter constraint pins down the investment
policy, and is equivalent to:(
K2t
Nt
)
(1− τ)
[
µ − ρ − φ
(
K2t
Nt
)θ−1]
= ρτ (54)
This gives equation (31) in proposition 3. Substituting into (27) the process for Nt becomes:
dNt =
[
k2
(
µ− ρ − φ
(
K2t
Nt
)θ−1)
K2t + n2ρNt − mr2t
]
dt + σ∗K2t dz (55)
where k2 ≡ 0 and n2 ≡ 1.
In regime 3 the governance constraint imposes condition (25). Substituting into (27) the
process for Nt becomes:
dNt =
[
k3
(
µ− ρ − φ
(
K3t
Nt
)θ−1)
K3t + n3ρNt − mr3t
]
dt + σ∗K3t dz (56)
where k3 ≡ (1− τ)/(1− α) and n3 ≡ (1− α− τ)/(1− α).
Applying Bellman’s principle of optimality and Ito’s lemma, from the theory of stochastic
optimal control it is known (see e.g. Merton (1969, 1971)) that for an infinite time horizon
the value function Mi satisfies the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman differential equation:
δMi(Nt) = max
Kit,rit
{
u(rit) +
[
ki(µ − ρ − φ
(
Kit
Nt
)θ−1
)Kt + niρNt − mrit
]
∂Mi
∂Nt
+
1
2
σ∗2K2it
∂2Mi
∂N2t
}
for i = 1, 2 or 3 (57)
and where ki and ni are as previously defined. Note that in regime 2 (i=2), the variable
K2t is no longer a control variable as it is already determined by the constraint (54). Given
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managers’ power utility function and the homogeneity of the problem it follows that Mi must
be proportional to Nt
γ/γ. We therefore conjecture the following solution for managers’ value
function: Mi(Nt) = biNt
γ/γ, where bi is a constant that remains to be determined for each
of the three regimes (i=1,2,3).
The first order condition for rents is given by:
u′(rit) = m
∂Mi
∂N
⇐⇒ rit =
(
mbi
ν
) 1
γ−1
Nt ≡ qiNt for i = 1, 2, 3 (58)
The first order condition for investment in regimes 1 and 3 is:
ki
(
µ − ρ − θφ
(
Kit
Nt
)θ−1)
∂Mi(N)
∂Nt
+ σ∗2Kit
∂2Mi(N)
∂N2t
= 0 (59)
⇐⇒ ki
(
µ − ρ − θφ
(
Kit
Nt
)θ−1)
+ σ∗2(γ − 1)
(
Kit
Nt
)
= 0 for i = 1, 3 (60)
which gives the optimality condition (30). In what follows define li = lit ≡ KitNt . Substituting
the solution for Mi and rit into (57) gives:
0 =
ν
γ
(
bim
ν
) γ
γ−1
Nγ − δbiN
γ
γ
+
1
2
σ∗2K2it(γ − 1)biNγ−2
+
[
ki(µ − ρ − φliθ−1)liNt + niρNt − m
(
bim
ν
) 1
γ−1
Nt
]
biN
γ−1 for i = 1, 2, 3
Dividing by biN
γ and simplifying gives equation (35) which determines bi for regimes 1,2 and
3.
Next, we verify the second order condition for the optimal rent and investment policies.
For regimes 1 and 3 the second order condition for a maximum requires that u′′(rt) < 0 and
that the determinant of the Hessian is positive, i.e.:
u′′(rt)
[
ki(1− θ)φθKit
θ−2
N θ−1
− σ
∗2(1− γ)
Nt
]
> 0 for i = 1, 3 (61)
⇐⇒ ki(1− θ)φθ
(
Kit
Nt
)θ−2
< σ∗2 (1− γ) for u′′(rt) < 0 (62)
Since ki ≥ 0, γ < 1 and θ ≥ 1, it follows that the second order condition is satisfied for regimes
1 and 3. In regime 2 the investment policy is determined by the governance constraint. Only
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rents are freely chosen. Consequently, the second order condition is given by u′′(rt) < 0, which
is always satisfied.
Next, we verify the transversality condition limt→∞E
[
e−δtM(Nt)
]
= 0. Under the optimal
rent and investment policies the process for Nt is given by: dNt = giNtdt + σiN Ntdz where:
gi ≡
[
ki
(
µ− ρ − φliθ−1
)
li + n3ρ − mqi
]
and σiN ≡ σ∗li (63)
Define yt ≡ Ntγ. Applying Ito’s lemma it follows that:
dy =
[
γgi − 0.5γ(1− γ)σ2iN
]
ydt + γσiNydz (64)
Hence it follows that the transversality condition becomes:
lim
t→∞
E0
[
e−δtM(Nt)
]
= lim
t→∞
bi
γ
y0 e
[γgi− 0.5γ(1−γ)σ2iN − δ]t = 0 (65)
⇐⇒ γ
[
gi − 1
2
(1− γ)σ2iN
]
< δ (66)
The transversality condition imposes a restriction on the rate of growth of the net worth
process under the optimal policies. We also verify that the market values Rt and St are
bounded. Rt and St are given by:
Rit = Et
[∫ ∞
t
e−ρuriudu
]
= Et
[∫ ∞
t
e−ρuqiNudu
]
=
qiNt
ρ − gi (67)
S1t = αmR1t and S2t = S3t = αNt (68)
Imposing the growth condition ρ > gi ensures that all market values are bounded.
Next, we calculate the critical values for µ that separate the regimes 1,2 and 3, correspond-
ing, respectively, to Ft > Nt, Ft = Nt and Ft < Nt. We know that Ft = St + (1− τs)Rt. The
going concern value in regime 1, F1t, is increasing in µ whereas the liquidation value Nt is
independent of µ. Let µˆ denote the expected return on assets for which F1t and Nt intersect.
The critical threshold µˆ that separates regimes 1 and 2 is the solution to:
F1t = S1t + (1− τs)R1t = R1t [αm+ 1− τs] = mRt = mq1Nt
ρ− g1 = Nt (69)
⇐⇒ mq1 = ρ− g1 ⇐⇒ ρτ = (1− τ)
(
µˆ− ρ− φl1θ−1
)
l1 (70)
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where l1 is itself a function of µˆ.
The going concern value in regime 3 F3t is increasing in µ. The critical threshold µ that
separates regimes 2 and 3 is the solution to:26
F3t = αNt +
(1− τs)q3
ρ − g3 Nt = Nt (71)
⇐⇒ mq3 = ρ − g3 ⇐⇒ ρτ = (1− τ)
(
µ− ρ− φl3θ−1
)
l3 (72)
where l3 is itself a function of µ. It follows immediately that µˆ and µ do not depend on Nt.
Therefore, changes in Nt do not lead to regime switches.
Next, define f(l) ≡ (µ− ρ− φlθ−1) l. It follows that f ′(l) > 0 ⇐⇒ l < (µ−ρ
φθ
) 1
θ−1 ≡ lo,
which is satisfied since the first-best investment level lo is the highest possible investment
level. Since k1 ≡ 1− τ < k3 ≡ (1− τ)/(1−α), it follows from (30) that l1(µ) < l3(µ) for any
given µ. Since f ′(l) > 0, it then follows from (70) and (72) that µ < µˆ.
Finally, we prove that both governance constraints bind for µ ∈]µ, µˆ[. We know from (30)
and (31) that l1(µ) < l2(µ) < l3(µ) for µ ∈]µ, µˆ[. Consider the optimal solution l2(µ). Suppose
first that the going concern constraint does not bind, and that managers optimize subject to
the liquidation constraint only. In that case investment would rise from l2(µ) to l3(µ) and
the going concern value would become F3(µ) > Nt since µ > µ. But now the liquidation
constraint no longer binds, and therefore the solution cannot be optimal from managers’
viewpoint. Suppose next that the liquidation constraint does not bind, and that managers
optimize subject to the going concern constraint only. In that case investment would drop
from l2(µ) to l1(µ) and the going concern value would become F1(µ) < Nt since µ < µˆ. But
now the liquidation constraint is violated and outsiders would intervene. Therefore a solution
where either the liquidation constraint or either the going concern constraint binds, but not
both, cannot be an equilibrium for µ ∈]µ, µˆ[.
26Likewise, equations (70) and (72) also define the critical thresholds τˆ and τ if we take µ as fixed. We refer
to the online appendix D for an example.
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Proof of proposition 4
Given the process (40) for Nt, M(Nt) must satisfy the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
differential equation:
δM(Nt) = max
Kt,rt
{
u(rt) + [(µ
∗ − ρ∗)Kt + ρ∗Nt − mrt ] ∂M
∂N
+
1
2
σ∗2K2t
∂M2
∂N2
}
(73)
The optimal rent and investment policies are the solution to:
u′(rt) = m
∂M
∂Nt
(74)
σ∗2Kt
∂2M
∂N2t
= −(µ∗ − ρ∗) ∂M
∂Nt
(75)
Given managers’ negative exponential utility function, we conjecture the following solution
for M(Nt), and determine the conditions under which this is indeed the solution:
M(Nt) = U − b e−aNt for Nt > 0 (76)
M(Nt) = U for Nt ≤ 0 (77)
where a, b, U and U are constants that remain to be determined. Substituting the conjectured
solution for M(Nt) into the optimality conditions for rt and Kt gives:
rt =
a
η
Nt − 1
η
ln(
mab
η
) (78)
Kt =
µ∗ − ρ∗
aσ∗2
≡ K (79)
It follows immediately that the optimal investment policy is constant, independent of Nt and
Dt and therefore also independent of the firm’s financing policy. The second order condition
for a maximum requires that u′′(rt) < 0 and that the determinant of the Hessian is positive,
i.e.:
σ∗2u′′(rt)(−1)a2be−aNt > 0 ⇐⇒ b > 0 (80)
Since u′′(rt) < 0, the second order condition is satisfied if b > 0, which we verify below.
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Substituting the solution into the fundamental optimality equation gives:
u − mab
η
e−aNt − δU + δbe−aNt − 1
2
σ∗2K2a2be−aNt (81)
+
[
(µ∗ − ρ∗)K + ρ∗Nt − maη Nt + mη ln(mabη )
]
ab e−aNt = 0 (82)
For this equation to be satisfied for all Nt we have to impose the following conditions:
U =
u
δ
(83)
a =
ρ∗η
m
(84)
0 = δ − ma
η
− 1
2
σ∗2K2a2 + (µ∗ − ρ∗)Ka + ma
η
ln(
mab
η
) (85)
The first and second equation pin down U and a, respectively, whereas the third equation
determines b. Solving (85) for b gives:
b =
1
ρ∗
e
− 1
ρ∗
[
δ−ρ∗+ 1
2
(µ∗ − ρ∗)2
σ∗2
]
> 0 (86)
Since b > 0 this verifies the second order condition.
The value matching condition requires that M(0) = U − b = U . We therefore impose the
following constraint on managers’ outside utility: U = u
δ
− b.
Finally, we prove that the transversality condition limt→∞E
[
e−δtM(Nt)
]
= 0 is satisfied.
Under the optimal rent and investment policies the process for Nt is given by: dNt = g dt +
σN dz where:
g ≡ (µ
∗ − ρ∗)2m
ηρ∗σ∗2
+
m
η
ln(bρ∗) =
(µ∗ − ρ∗)2m
2ηρ∗σ∗2
− m(δ − ρ
∗)
ηρ∗
(87)
σN ≡ (µ
∗ − ρ∗)m
ηρ∗σ∗
(88)
Define yt ≡ e−aNt . Applying Ito’s lemma it follows that:
dy =
[
1
2
a2σ2N − ag
]
ydt − aσNydz (89)
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Hence it follows that the transversality condition becomes:
lim
t→∞
E0
[
e−δtM(Nt)
]
= lim
t→∞
b y0 e
[ 12a2σ2N − ag− δ]t = 0 (90)
⇐⇒ 1
2
a2σ2N − ag − δ < 0 (91)
⇐⇒ η
2ρ∗2(µ∗ − ρ∗)2
2m2η2ρ∗2σ∗2
− ηρ
∗
m
[
(µ∗ − ρ∗)2m
2ηρ∗σ∗2
− m(δ − ρ
∗)
ηρ∗
]
− δ < 0 ⇐⇒ −ρ∗ < 0
Hence, the transversality condition is satisfied.
Proof of proposition 5
If investors are risk neutral then the market value of managers’ rents must satisfy the
following equilibrium condition:
ρRt = rt +
d
d∆
EtRt+∆
∣∣∣∣
∆=0
(92)
Under the assumption that Rt is a twice continuously differentiable function of Nt application
of Ito’s lemma gives:
ρR(Nt) =
ρ∗
m
Nt − 1
η
ln(bρ∗) + gR′(Nt) +
1
2
σ2N R
′′(Nt) (93)
where g and σN are defined in (87) and (88), respectively. The general solution to the o.d.e.
is:
R(Nt) = A0 + A1Nt + A2e
λNt + A3e
κNt (94)
Substituting into the o.d.e. gives:
ρA0 + ρA1Nt + ρA2e
λNt + ρA3e
κNt =
ρ∗
m
Nt − 1
η
ln(bρ∗) + gA1
+ gλA2e
λNt +
1
2
σ2Nλ
2A2e
λNt + gκA3e
κNt +
1
2
σ2Nκ
2A3e
κNt (95)
It follows that ρA1 =
ρ∗
m
, or equivalently A1 =
1−τ
m
and that:
A0 =
g
ρ
A1 − 1
ηρ
ln(bρ∗) =
g(1− τ)
mρ
− 1
ρη
ln(bρ∗) (96)
ρ = gλ +
1
2
σ2Nλ
2 (97)
ρ = gκ +
1
2
σ2Nκ
2 (98)
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Let λ and κ be, respectively, the negative and positive root of the above quadratic equation.
Since the firm does not have any growth options, it must be the case that limNt→+∞R(Nt) =
A0 + A1Nt and therefore A3 = 0. Next, upon closure at Nt = 0 managers receive no fur-
ther rents, i.e. R(0) = 0. Hence, the value matching condition at Nt = 0 requires that
R(0) = A0 + A2 = 0 or equivalently: A2 = −A0, which completes the solution for R(Nt).
Finally, since dt = αmrt, it follows immediately that St = αmRt.
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Figure 1: The figure illustrates the effect of the expected rate of return on risky projects µ
on the firm’s corporate policies for two different levels of volatility (σ). The values for the
parameters are: s = 0.8, ρ = 0.06, δ = 0.08, φ = 0.03, η = 0.2, ν = 0.8, τ = 0.3, θ = 1.25 and
α = 0.9.
Figure 2: The figure plots the investment and financing policies as a function of the tax rate
(τ) and managers’ coefficient of risk aversion (η) for two different levels of volatility (σ). The
base parameter values used to generate the plots are: µ = 0.12, s = 0.8, ρ = 0.06, δ = 0.08,
φ = 0.03, τ = 0.3, η = 0.2, ν = 0.8, θ = 1.25 and α = 0.9.
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